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Abstract 
There are studies in developed countries about the influence of ownership percentage in board of management on diversification 
strategy preferences. It is concluded that there is a negative relation between diversification strategy behavior and the ownership 
percentage of management or other elements of management structure in most of these studies. In this study, it is aimed to test 
whether there is a relation between executive structure and diversification strategy preferences in our country in light of the means 
of evidence of agency theory. Herfindahl Index used widely in the literature was used for diversification measure in the study. The 
data of businesses listed in Istanbul Stock Exchange was used to understand the relation between diversification behavior and 
executive structure. The data of these businesses were obtained from www.kap.gov.tr and www.imkb.gov.tr .  
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1. Introduction 
While 
propositions in Turkish literature, there are lots of studies in this field in foreign literature. The study of Hoskisson and 
Ma , the study of Lane 
Agency Problems As Antecedents To Unrelated Mergers And Diversification: Amihud And 
Lev Reconsidered Agency Theory And The Influence Of Equity 
Ownership Structure On Corporate Diversification Strategies The Effects Of 
, the study of Amihud and Lev (1999) Does 
 Goronava and others 
Managerial Ownership And Corporate Diversification: A Longitudinal View
and others (2008) na Multiple Directorships And Corporate Diversification
Co .   
 
 Hoskisson and others told in their theoretical study that limiting diversification reduces executive risk-taking 
strategy and agency theory and it shows that 
findings show that there are strong findings between diversification strategy and executive structure. In other words, 
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when the ownership ratio increases in business management, business diversification is negatively affected according 
 
 
the ownership ratio in business management 
Accordingly, while agent CEO focuses on internal output, owner CEO gives more importance to the output for 
expansion (Eisenman, 2002). The results of Ducassy an  in France concludes that family 
businesses diversify more than non-family businesses; there is no significant difference between family businesses and 
gle 
businesses (Ducassy and Prevot, 2010). 
 
As mentioned in the indicated studies, the relation between diversification strategy and executive structure is 
complex. In this study having a goal to understand this relation; types, reasons, advantages and risks of diversification 
strategy will be explained first. Then reasons, advantages and problems of agency theory will be studied. After that, 
the relation between diversification strategy and agency theory will be explained with reference to Turkey and the 
hypotheses will be suggested. An empirical study will be made in Istanbul Stock Exchange in order to test the 
hypotheses suggested for understanding the relation between diversification strategy and executive structure. 
 
2. Diversification Strategy 
   
Each of the probable economic benefits of related and unrelated diversification will be examined under the name 
of this title. 
 
2.1. Unrelated Diversification 
 
As mentioned above in unrelated diversification, there is not any relationship between the company's strategic 
business units in terms of technological or market relations. So why do companies prefer an unrelated growth? Can a 
company create any value by unrelated diversification (Craig and Grant, 1993)? There are five basic factors that can 
be regarded as answers to such questions: 
 Risk Reduction: Companies whose products are threatened by the environmental uncertainty or in decline phase of 
their life curve can prefer to engage in an unrelated diversification to overcome the risk arising from current industries. 
Expanding its product line and activities to different sectors where the environmental uncertainty is reduced and, 
profitability is higher, a company may confirm its survival thus will make its cash flow more reliable (Hitt and Irelant, 
2007). Decrease in Transaction Costs: Considering each strategic business units of unrelated diversified businesses as 
profit centers, and the fact that top executives monitor each strategic unit, the top executives will have the opportunity 
to access all the available information regarding each independent business unit and the whole of the company at the 
lowest transaction cost (Craig and Grant, 1993). Decrease in Costs of Service: Some activities such as legal services, 
public relations, the company's case security, internal audit, investment decisions can be performed centrally at 
company level for all strategic business units. Although there may not be a relation in operational sense, such activities 
can be cost-saving benefits on behalf of the unrelated diversification strategy (Craig and Grant, 1993). Accessing 
management skills: Based on the claim, which needs a scientific support, that the executives have skills hard to 
achieve promotes the idea that the successful executives of companies engaged in unrelated diversification will be 
successful in new investments (Miller and Dess, 1996). Exploiting inefficiencies in the market's valuation of 
companies: Opportunities may arise for companies from time to time. These opportunities in some cases, are detected 
with rationale while in some cases may be based on intuition. An executive that feels he has enough knowledge may 
capture the opportunity of high profitability by investing in a new field by intuition (Craig and Grant, 1993).  
 
2.2. Related Diversification 
 
According to Craig and Grant, a competitive advantage of related diversification will be possible only by sharing 
of non-physical and physical resources, proliferation of some management skills into the strategic business units 
(Craig and Grant, 1993). 
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2.2.1.  Sharing Physical Resources 
 
 There are two factors which affect performance based on physical resources. Firstly, the potential relationship of 
strategic business units can be identified and the utility of the resource can be enhanced so as to be utilized collectively 
by all the strategic units. Secondly, especially during the production process, already existing products which are 
complementary to each other can be commonly used. In both cases, the collective use of physical resources can help to 
provide cost savings for strategic business units (Farjoun, 1998).  
 
2.2.2. The effect of Sharing Intangible Resources and Transfer of Skills 
 
 Brand and Reputation -known brand value contributes positively to the performance of 
strategic business units. Reputati
(Cohen, 2005; Craig and Grant, 1993). Technology
capabilities so as to contribute to its growth and competitive advantage. The companies aware of their technological 
superiority can invest in new areas after analyzing where and how to use their superiority (Chiu and others, 2008).  
Operational Capability: It refers to the transfer of the capability of production of strategic business units to some other 
diversified business areas; more precisely that is the ability that one of the strategic business units has can be used by 
other units where the production process is similar (Craig and Grant, 1993). Sharing General Management Skills: In 
case of transfer or share of resources and capabilities among strategic business units of diversified companies some 
technical or market relatedness is needed. The capabilities transferred are not only functional skills but also are in 
relation to general management skills (Helfat and Eisenheart, 2004).  
 
2.2. Risks And Disadvantages Of Diversification Strategy 
 
One of the reasons for the failure of corporate diversification strategies stands out as the bureaucratic costs. It is 
possible to examine bureaucratic costs under two main headings (Hill and Jones, 1998). Number of businesses: 
whole of the company thus deteriorations in performance happen. The main reason for the loss of this control appears 
to be the concept of limited rationality which refers to not having all the data required for rational decision-making 
(Hoskisson and others, 1991). Coherence between Businesses: Transfer of resources among the strategic business units 
requires an effective coordination system. Since the processes will be filled with bureaucratic procedures, increasing 
n determination, transfer and share of 
resources required by the units (Hill and Jones, 1998). Other routine activities are also encountered as a cost element 
in the bureaucratic processes and procedures. Routine activities and procedures in a growing majority of organizations 
appear as an element of cost, and the difficulty of changing these processes can result in deteriorated business 
performance. For instance, in case that changes in the processes, strategy, product, innovation, creativity and structure 
require alterations in the basic level of operational activities of strategic business units; a unique coordination problem 
will occur (Hoskisson and others, 1991).  
 
Stock Return Risk: The findings of the prior research suggest that related diversification yields significant 
performance advantages and that related investments are relatively less risky and highly profitable to unrelated 
diversification (Chang and Thomas, 1989). In each diversification strategy regardless of being related or unrelated 
diversified, there is the problem of return risk despite different rates. Differences in risk-return rates will vary 
depending on the sector, the company size, the number of businesses within the company and the degree of related 
diversification (Hill and Jones, 1998).  
 
3. The Relation Between Diversification Strategy And Ownership Structure, Executive Structure And The 
Hypotheses Of The Study  
3.2. Stakeholder Control and Diversification 
 It is possible to say that there are three main approaches about this field. The relationship between diversification 
and these three approaches named agency theory, strategy and stewardship theory is as stated below. It is possible to 
see this relation in Table 1 (Ducassy and Prevot, 2010).  
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3.2.2. Agency Theory Approach 
 
 Agency theory viewing agent-principal relationship in organizations was mentioned first by Eisenhardt ( Kim and 
others, 2005; Eisenhardt , 1989). This theory deals with the relations of two people whose aims and interests are 
eory focuses on that the agent will not always make an effort for 
beings are inherently selfish and willing to enhance their own interests (Cohen and Baruch, 2010).  
 
According to opportunism based economic approach, the agent will make an effort for enhancing his personal 
interests. Thus, the economic actors can keep their own interests superior by wrong information, hiding the existing 
situation or deflecting it. In order to minimize these opportunism based risks that can be because of agents, the 
principles want to detail this relation by obtaining a contract which is for following and  
(Wright and others, 2001). 
 
This approach focused on economy is based on agency theory. According to the results of the studies (Amihud and 
Lev, 1999; Eisenman, 2002) based on agency theory, the existence of stakeholder control in management effects 
diversification level negatively
individual risks, brings them prestige and opportunities to increase their power (Ducassy and Prevot, 2010). 
 
Table 1.Agency theory, strategic approach and stewardship theory. 
 Agency theory Strategic approach Stewardship theory 
Foundations Economy  Strategy Sociology and psychology 
Model of human behavior Individual interests  Interests of the organization Collective interest 
Incentives to motivate managers Financial incentives  
Share ownership 
 
 Performance maximizing  Commitment 
Relationships between 
shareholder and managers 
Divergence of interests  
 
Shareholders do not have 
enough information to evaluate 
the strategic decisions 
 
 Convergence of interests 
Organization of the relationship Control   Delegation  Confidence 
Control mechanisms Financial incentives Governance 
founded on an external control 
Autonomy of the manager 
Demand of maximizing share 
value 
Participation of the 
managers in governance 
Reasons for diversification Reduction of the personal 
risk of the managers 
Prestige and power 
Remuneration, Entrenchment 
Leveraging of the resources 
Economies of variety 
Synergies 
Power over the market 
Financial performance 
Interests for the business 
Connection between  shareholder 
control and diversification 
Negative  Negligible Negligible 
 Isabella Ducassy and Frederic Prevot,  The Effects Of Family Dynamics On Diversification Strategy: Empirical Evidence From French Companies, 
Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2010, pp.224-235. 
 
3.2.3. Stewardship Theory 
 
 The management based theory claims that the social environment and institutional ethical values will shape the 
behaviors of agents (Quinn and Jones, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). According to this approach, agents can 
enhance their own interests. As a result, according to stewardship theory, agents will make their decisions on 
enhancing corporation interests unlike the approach which indicates managers have a economic-oriented view about 
diversification strategy. In other words, if it is admitted that diversification has an organizational performance-
enhancing effect, the corporate will diversify (Ducassy and Prevot, 2010). 
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3.2.4. Strategic approach 
Another approach that explains the reason why businesses prefer diversification strategy as stakeholder control is 
strategic approach. According to this approach, organizations prefer diversification if it increases organizational 
performance. Diversification will increase organizational performance by organizational skills, synergy due to 
common usage of sources (Craig and Grant, 1993) and the distribution of risk as a result of investing in different fields 
(Hitt and Irelant, 2007). According to the study of Lane and others (1998), there is not a relationship between 
ownership structure and diversification. However, there is a relationship between ownership structure and 
diversification strategies according to the studies of Amihud-Lev and Dennis (Ducassy and Prevot, 2010). When the 
percentage of ownership increases, companies prefer less diversification. Therefore, they can have more control over 
all of the companies owned by them. Thus, we develop and test the following hypothesis 1, 
 
H1: There is a significant difference between percentage of ownership and diversification measure. 
 
3.3. Turkey, A Developing Country, and Diversification Strategies-Executive Structure Relation 
Unlike large US and UK corporations with their dispersed ownership structures, many of the largest corporations 
in Germany show concentrated ownership structures. It is reported that out of 171 large corporations, 85% have a 
shareholder with at least 25%, and 57% have a shareholder owning more than 50% of the equity 
2006). It is understood that ownership structure is concentrated  
 
It was stated that the Turkish corporations have a centralist and ownership concentrated structure in 
study about the Turkish corp  ownership structure. It is stated that the institutional executive structure in 
Turkey is a system based on in-house management. Families have got most of the shares of corporations directly or 
indirectly and protect the majority of control. Ownership and separation of control are created by using   pyramid 
capital structures or coalitions with other families and foreign firms. Also, it is known that the government has been 
the founder and executive of large and medium-sized firms in banking and i
2000).  Hypothesis 2; 
 
H2: There is a significant difference between ownership structure and diversification. 
 
According to Khanna and Palepu, unlike in developed countries, corporate environmental factors such as gaps in 
developing country markets, business government relations, production, markets and  labor market can be effectual for 
companies that have engaged in diversification strategy (Khanna and Palepu, 1997).  There are findings about that 
there is a negative relationship between organizational performance and executive ownership in developing countries 
- organizational performance relation and intensity of diversification in Turkey have 
the similar results as in developing countr
The reasons of diversification and executive structure in Turkey differ from developed countries, so it is quite possible 
that the relationship between diversification structure and ownership structure is different in Turkey. As a result, 
hypothesis 3 is as below along with other possible factors:  
 
H3:  There is a significant difference between executive ownership and the degree of diversification.  
 
4. A research About The Businesses Listed In Istanbul Exchange Stock 
4.2. The Aim Of The Research 
The aim of the research is to see if there is a correlation between Herfindahl Index diversification measure and the 
ownership percentage of the businesses included in the research universe and if it is so to identify the possible effects 
of ownership percentage on diversification behavior. The research also aims to identify the existence of a significant 
difference between ownership/executive structure and diversification degree. 
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4.3. The Research Universe 
The research universe is the 359 companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange Market and whose shares got 
traded in period of 2005-2009. A sample group is not selected for the analysis; but full counting is carried out. 
Although shares of 359 companies were traded as of 2009, total data of 342 companies listed on ISE were analyzed 
since the 17 of them are excluded because of their fund traits. 
 4.4. The variables and measurement methods of the research 
 
The independent variable of the research is ownership structure and the dependent variable is diversification. 
 
4.4.2. Diversification Measure 
 
In this study diversification measure is Herfindahl Index; perhaps the most widely used measure of economic 
concentration.  Thus, our first proposed index is  
 
 
Where: DI  =  diversification  index,  HI  =  Herfindahl  Index,  Wi =  the  proportion  of portfolio  market value  
invested  in  security  i (in decimal  form),  and  N  =  the  number  of securities  in the  portfolio. Our use of the  
complement  of this  index  is for  the  stylistic  purpose  of altering  the index  value  so that  zero represents  a 
portfolio  with absolutely  no diversification  (a one security  portfolio)  and 1 .O would represent  the  ultimate  in 
diversification (Woerheide and Persson, 1993). 
 
. 4.3.2. Ownership Structure 
 
We measure executive ownership as the percentage of shares outstanding owned by the CEO (Denis et al, 1997; 
Grant, Jammine, and Thomas, 1988). Ownership structure and executive structure in Turkey were classified as below.  
Ownership structure has four subgroups named single family, multifamily, public enterprise, and foundation. 
Executive structure has four subgroups named owner controlled, owner concentrated, manager concentrated and 
management controlled.  
 
4.4. Analysis 
 
Herfindahl diversification measure based analysis was used in the research to see the percentage of ownership - 
diversification relationship of the businesses listed in Istanbul Exchange Stock. First of all, correlation analysis is 
utilized for the dependent and the independent variables  and then regression analysis is used to see the probable affect 
of percentage of ownership on diversification degree.  Secondly, we will analyze if there is a significant difference 
between diversification strategies and executive structure, ownership structure or the percentage of ownership.  
Finally, if there is a significant difference, Mann Whitney U test will be used to understand the relation between 
ownership and subgroups of executive structure.   
 
4.4.1.  Degree Of Diversification, Percentage Of Ownership Correlation  Analysis 
In order to understand the relationship, the percentage of ownership and degree of diversification are subjected to 
correlation analysis separately.  Table 2 demonstrates that there is correlation between percentage of ownership and 
diversification. Thus, hypothesis 1 is accepted. Accordingly, there is a negative weak relation between percentage of 
ownership and diversification. (p=0,046).  
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Table 2. Diversification, Percentage Of Ownership Correlation (Pearsonn) Analysis 
  HERFINDAHL Percentage of Ownership 
 
 
Percentage of Ownership 
 
 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1,000 -,181(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . ,046 
N 124 122 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).     **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
4.4.2.  Degree Of Diversification, Percentage Of Ownership Regression Analysis 
Table 3 demonstrates the linear regression analysis results intended for understanding how diversification strategy 
is explained by percentage of ownership. The research model identifies diversification value, as the dependent variable 
and percentage of ownership, as the independent variable as; It is understood that    Diversification (Herfindahl) equals 
to 0,215- 0,002 Percentage Of Ownership.  According to the research model, % 0,002 of the diversification value is 
explained by percentage of ownership. 
 
Table 3. Degree Of Diversification, Percentage Of Ownership Regression Analysis 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square F 
 ,181(a) ,033 ,025 4,052 
 B Beta T Sig 
(Constant) 
 
HERFINDAHL 
,215 
 
 4,087 ,000 
-,002 -,181 -2,013 ,046 
Dependent Variable: Herfindahl     Independent Variable: Percentage Of Ownership 
4.4.3. Degree Of Diversification, Ownership Structure  
 
 ic test, was used to test Hypothesis 2 which claims that there is a 
Mann-
order to test whether there is a significant difference between the two sub-variables in ownership structure group or 
not. The results of the analysis are below:  
Table 4. Degree of Diversification, Ownership Structure (Kruskall Wallis) 
The Measure of Ownership  Frequency Percentage Mean Rank     Kruskall Wallis 
Single ( or Family) Ownership 
 
44 36,06 
68,78 
Test Statisticsa,b 
Multi Ownership 
 
58 47,54 
54,76 
Chi-Square 11,765 
Public 9 7,37 49,44 Df 3 
Foundation 11 9,01 77,77 Asymp. Sig. 0,008 
Total 122 100  a. Kruskall Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: ownership 
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Hypothesis H2 is accepted  
As seen in Table 4,  the results of Kruskall Wallis analysis applied to test Hypothesis 2 show that  there is a 
statistically significant difference between ownership structure and diversification with a %5 error margin (Chi-
Square=11.765, p=0.008). According to the results of the research, Hypotheses 2 was partially confirmed. 
Accordingly, the foundation ownership has the highest diversification, and public ownership has the lowest 
diversification. Dual comparisons of ownership structure were analyzed by Mann-Whitney test to understand which 
subcategories have differences. 
Table 5. Single Family and Multifamily (Mann-Whitney U) 
Ownership Structure  N Mean Rank Sum Of Rank Mann-Whitney U                           987,000 
Single Family 44 58,07 2555 Wilcoxon W  2698,00 
Multifamily 58 46,52 2698 Z -2,516 
Total           102 - - Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0,012 
- - - - a.Grouping Variable: Sermaye 
 
As  shown in Table 5, according to the result of this analysis used for testing H2a, the sub hypothesis of H2, there is 
a significant difference between the diversification degree-single family ownership relationship and the diversification 
degree- multifamily ownership relationship with %5 error margin (p=0,012) and  Hypothesis 2a was accepted. 
Accordingly, the diversification degree of businesses in which ownership concentrated on a single family is higher 
than the businesses in which ownership concentrated on multi-families. 
Table 6. Multifamily and Foundations (Mann-Whitney U) 
Ownership Structure N Mean Rank Sum Of Rank Mann-Whitney U              196,000 
Multifamily 58 32,88 1907,00 Wilcoxon W 1907,00 
Foundation  11 46,18 508,00 Z -2,726 
Total             69 - - Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0,006 
- - - - a.Grouping Variable: Ownership Structure 
Analyses were performed to correct Benfoni. Accordingly, While we use p=0,005 for  Kruskall Wallis analysis, used  p=0,05/4=0,0125 for Mann-Whitney U test (Field, 2005). 
As  shown in Table 6, according to the result of this analysis used for testing H2e, the sub hypothesis of H2, there is 
a significant difference between the diversification degree- multifamily ownership relation and the diversification 
degree- foundation ownership relation with %5 error margin (p=0,006) and  Hypothesis 2e was accepted. Accordingly, 
the diversification degree of businesses in which foundation ownership concentrated is higher than the businesses in 
which ownership concentrated on multi-families. 
 
H2b, H2c, H2d and H2e, the sub hypotheses of H2 were tested by the means of Mann-Whitney U test. There is not a 
significant difference with %5 error margin between diversification degree-single family ownership relationship and 
diversification degree  public enterprise relationship (p=0,012), between diversification degree  single family 
ownership relationship and diversification degree foundation ownership relationship (p=0,46),  between 
diversification degree-multifamily ownership relationship and diversification foundation ownership relationship 
(p=0,549) and between diversification degree- public ownership relationship and diversification degree-foundation 
ownership relationship (p=0,029).   
 
4.4.4. Diversification Strategies and Executive Structure 
 
As seen in Table 7,  the results of Kruskall Wallis analysis applied to test Hypothesis 3 show that  
statistically significant difference between executive structure and diversification with a %5 error margin (Chi-
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Square=0.445, p=0931). According to the results of the research, Hypotheses 3 was rejected.  However, it is 
understood that the diversification value of foundation managers is bigger than the others in terms of Median values.  
Accordingly, it can be thought that these managers are more eager to diversify in businesses.  
Table 7. Diversification Strategies and Executive Structure (Kruskall Wallis) 
Executive Structure  Frequency Percentage Mean Rank     Kruskall Wallis 
Owner Controlled 19 15,57 60,05 Test Statisticsa,b 
Owner Concentrated, 61 50,00 60,76 Chi-Square 0,445 
Manager Concentrated 28 22,95 61,89 Df 3 
Management Controlled 14 11,47 65,89 Asymp. Sig. 0,931 
Total 122 100  a. Kruskall Wallis Test 
b.Grouping Variable:management 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
If the findings are evaluated in terms of diversification degree and ownership percentage in the diversified 
corporations, it is understood that ownership percentage effects diversification behavior. This result shows that more 
attention is given to the percentage of control in the corporation instead of diversifying when ownership percentage 
increases in the businesses researched.  
 
 The difference between holding company ownership structure and diversification was analyzed and when 
evaluated in terms of averages, it is understood that diversification degree is the highest in foundations and the lowest 
in public enterprises. This result indicates that investing in different fields, taking risks and turning environmental 
opportunities into advantages are more possible in foundation ownership. On the other hand, why diversification 
degree is the lowest in public enterprises can be associated with neo-liberal policies in Turkey.  Then, some 
institutions have been privatized or liquidated by the government in Turkey. Also, the reasons of high diversification 
degree in single family ownership can be the difficulty of having agreed decisions in case of the existence of different 
individuals, unwillingness to get risks, possible diversification reasons not on strong footings and different aims of 
individuals.  
 
rence between diversification degree 
and executive structure in Turkey such as dominance of owners on managers. Then, the owners get obliged to appoint 
some people as managers because of laws or other intuitional pressures.  It is possible that such managers behave 
 
 
The researchers interested in this field can make studies about the reasons of high diversification degree in single 
family businesses and the reasons of low diversification degree in multifamily businesses in Turkey. Also some other 
studies can be made about the relationship between organizational performance and ownership structure, ownership 
percentage or executive structure and about the relation of diversification strategy, organizational performance and 
agency theory.  
 
  REFERENCES 
 
-
-11. 
Chang, Yegmin and Ho -Return Performance, Strategic Management Journal 
10, pp.271-84. 
Chen- -Ju Chen And  Tsun- and Earnings 
24(2) 233-262. 
Chiu, Yi-Chia, Hsien-Che Lai, Tai-Yu Lee and Yi-Ching Liaw (2008), Technological Diversification, Complementary Assets and Performance, 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 75, pp.875-92. 
Craig, James C. and Robert M. Grant (1993),  Strategic Management, Kogan Page Limited, London. 
117 İhsan Yiğit and İbrahim Anıl /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  58 ( 2012 )  108 – 117 
Cohen, Jeffrey (2005), Intangible Assets;Valuation and Economic Benefit ,  Canada;John Wiley &Sons.  
Cohen Aaron, Yehuda Baruch (2010),  An Agency Theory Perspective Of The Israeli Labor Market Segmentation: Past, 
      Present, And Future, Human Resource Management Review 20, pp.186-193. 
porate 
-1076. 
Donaldson Thomas, Lee E. Preston (1995), The Stakeholder Theory Of The Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, And Implications,  Academy Of 
Managemenl Review Vol.20(1), pp.85-91. 
Eisenhardt Kathleen M.(1989), Agency Theory: An Assessment And Review, Academy Of Management  Review,  Vol.14,  No: 1, pp.S7-74. 
Eisenmann Thomas R. (2002), The Effects Of Ceo Equity Ownership And Firm Diversification O N Risk Taking, Strategic Management Journal 
23, pp.513- 534. 
Farjoun, Moshe (1998), The Independent and Joint Effects of The Skill and Physical Bases of Relatedness in Diversification, Strategic Management 
Journal.  19, pp.611-630. 
Field Andy (2005). Discovering Statistics Using SPSS. London:Sage Publications. Second Edition. 
Grant, Robert M., Azar P. Jammine, Howard Thomas (1988), Diversity, Diversification, And Profitability Among British Manufacturing 
Companies, 1972-84, Academy Of Management Journal, Vol.31(4), pp. 771-801. 
Haid, Alfred and Yurtoglu, B. Burcin (2006), Ownership Structure and Executive Compensation in Germany, SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=948926 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.948926. 
Helfat, Constance and Eisenhardt, Kathleen (2004),  Inter-Temporal Economies of Scope, Organizational Modularity, and the Dynamics of 
Diversification, Strategic Management Journal 25, pp1217-1232.  
Hill, L.Charles and Jones, Gareth R. (1998), Strategic Management  An Integrated Approach, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. 
Hitt, Michael A R. Duane Ireland, Robert E. Hoskisson(2007), Strategic management: Competitiveness and Globalization : Concepts & Cases, 
South Western Cengage Learning, Usa. 
Hoskisson, Robert E. , Michael A. H  
Organization Science Vol.2(3), pp.296-317.  
mpirical Evidence From French 
235. 
Laszlo Tihanyi, Richard Johnson, Robert Hoskisson, Michael 
The Effects Of Boards O (2), 195-211. 
Khanna, Tarun, Krishna Palepu (1997), Why Focused Strategies May be Wrong For Emerging Markets,  Harvard Business Review July, pp. 41-51.  
Kim, Bongjin John E. Prescott, Sung Min Kim (2005), Differentiated Governance Of Foreign Subsidiariesin Transnational Corporations: An 
Agency Theory Perspective, Journal Of International Management 11, pp. 43- 66. 
 
tion: A 
 225.  
Studies 31(1): 69-81. 
Miller, Alex and Gregory, G. Dess (1996), Strategic Management, The Mcgraw-Hill Companies, Second Edition. 
Peter J. Lane, Albert A. Cannella,  An
578. 
Finance 15  418  435.  
Quinn Dennis P. Thomas  Jones (1995), An Agent Morality View Of Business Policy, Academy Of Management Review Vol. 20, No:1,  pp. 22-42. 
fication and Firm Performance: The Moderating Influence of Ownership Structure and Business Group-
South Asian Journal of Management, 14(3):65-94. 
Organization  Science  2(3):296-314.  
Ankara 
2, s.201-214. 
-85. 
Wright, Peter,  Ananda Mukherji, Mark J. Kroll (2001), A reexamination of agency theory assumptions:extensions and extrapolations, Journal of 
Socio-Economics 30, pp. 413 429. 
Xiaorong Li, Kami Rwegasira (
Transnational Management 13(2):132-147.  
, Strategic 
Management Journal 20: 1063-1069. 
 The Relation Between Diversification Strategy And Organizational Performance:A Research On Companies 
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  24, pp. 1494-1509. 
Yurtoglu, B. Burcin (2000), Ownership, Control And Performance Of Turkish Listed Firms, Empirica 27,  Pp. 193 222. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
